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MAKING SENSE OF DIVINE SIMPLICITY
Jeﬀrey E. Brower

According to the doctrine of divine simplicity, God is an absolutely simple
being lacking any distinct metaphysical parts, properties, or constituents. Although this doctrine was once an essential part of traditional philosophical
theology, it is now widely rejected as incoherent. In this paper, I develop
an interpretation of the doctrine designed to resolve contemporary concerns
about its coherence, as well as to show precisely what is required to make
sense of divine simplicity.

Few tenets of classical theism strike contemporary philosophers as more
perplexing or diﬃcult to comprehend than the doctrine of divine simplicity—that is, the doctrine that God is an absolutely simple being, completely
devoid of any sort of metaphysical complexity. This doctrine has its roots
in antiquity, perhaps tracing ultimately to Parmenides, but it receives its
most elaborate development and careful defense at the hands of philosophers and theologians during the Middle Ages. According to the standard
medieval understanding—as epitomized by Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas—the doctrine entails not only that God lacks the obvious forms of complexity associated with the possession of material or temporal parts, but
also that he lacks even the minimal form of complexity associated with the
possession of distinct properties or attributes. Thus, from the fact that God
is divine, medieval thinkers infer that God is identical with his nature or
divinity; from the fact that he is good, they infer that he is identical with his
goodness; and so on in every other such case. And, of course, from the fact
that God is identical with each of these things, they infer that each of them
is identical with each of the others.
It is easy to see why contemporary philosophers find the doctrine so
diﬃcult. As stated, it seems to entail that God is identical with each of his
properties—and, by implication, that each of his properties is identical
with each of the others, and hence that God is himself a property. But that
seems absurd. “The trouble with the idea” C. B. Martin once remarked
“is just that it is hogwash.”1 Other philosophers have drawn the same
conclusion, sometimes going a step further and claiming, with Quentin
Smith, that the doctrine is not only “plainly self-contradictory” but actually “testifies to the predominance of faith over intellectual coherence in
some Christian circles.”2
Given the stature of the thinkers who have endorsed this doctrine historically, it is not surprising that a number of contemporary philosophers have
come to its defense, arguing that divine simplicity is at least coherent, even
if not ultimately acceptable.3 For all their ingenuity, however, contemporary
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defenses of the doctrine continue to fall on deaf ears. My purpose in this
paper is two-fold: to explain why this is case, and to mount a new defense,
one that succeeds where the others have failed to resolve contemporary
concerns about the doctrine’s coherence.
As will become clear when I discuss the doctrine below, there is nothing
in divine simplicity itself that requires us to identify God with a property.
On the contrary, the doctrine requires only that God is identical with the
entities (such as God’s goodness, God’s power, and God’s wisdom) that are required to explain the truths expressed by true intrinsic predications of the
form “God is F.”4 That is to say, the doctrine requires nothing more than
the following:
(DS): If an intrinsic predication of the form “God is F” is true, then
God’s F-ness exists and is identical with God.
But if this is all the doctrine requires, then the doctrine itself takes no stand
on the precise nature of the entities with which it identifies God. Hence
the apparent absurdity that God is a property follows not from divine
simplicity itself, but rather from its conjunction with something like the
following “property account” of predication:
(PA): If an intrinsic predication of the form “a is F” is true, then a’s F-ness
exists, where this entity is to be understood as a property.
Although contemporary defenders of divine simplicity often recognize
that something like PA is at the root of contemporary diﬃculties with the
doctrine, they are extremely reluctant to abandon it. Indeed, as we shall
see, they almost always prefer to defend the claim that God is a property
rather than develop an account of predication in terms of something other
than properties. This explains, I think, the general failure of contemporary
defenses of the doctrine: most accept some form of property interpretation
(i.e., the conjunction of DS and PA), which certainly seems absurd; and
those that don’t, fail to develop the sort of account of predication needed
to render the doctrine coherent.
My own defense of simplicity is designed to pick up where these others
leave oﬀ. It employs an alternative account of predication, one that makes
crucial use of the notion of a truthmaker:
(TA): If an intrinsic predication of the form “a is F” is true, then a’s F-ness
exists, where this entity is to be understood as the truthmaker for
“a is F.”
Interpreted in light of TA, the doctrine of divine simplicity avoids the
problems associated with the property interpretation. For so interpreted,
the doctrine entails that God is identical with each of the truthmakers for
the true (intrinsic) predications that can be made about him—indeed, that
God himself is the truthmaker for each of these predications. But unlike the
claim that God is a property, these claims seem perfectly coherent (at least
on the assumption that truthmaker theory is itself coherent).5 Obviously,
there is much in this interpretation, as well as the “truthmaker account” of
predication underlying it, that requires explanation and defense. But I shall
postpone that until later in the paper.6
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My discussion will proceed as follows. I begin in Section 1 with a brief
account of the doctrine of divine simplicity, making clear why contemporary philosophers find it so natural to interpret it in terms of properties. In
Section 2, I explain why, for all its attractiveness, the property interpretation
of simplicity should be rejected (at least given certain standard views about
properties). I then turn, in Section 3, to the task of developing a satisfactory
alternative. Here I begin by critiquing two alternative suggestions that have
been made in the literature, before advancing my own preferred truthmaker interpretation. Finally, I conclude my discussion, in Section 4, with
a defense of the truthmaker interpretation, arguing that, in fact, it provides
the only way of rendering the doctrine of divine simplicity coherent.
1. The Doctrine of Divine Simplicity
Most contemporary philosophers writing on divine simplicity take themselves to be working with the doctrine as understood by thinkers such as
Augustine, Anselm, or Aquinas. It will be useful, therefore, to have before
us a few of their characteristic statements of the doctrine. Here is a familiar
passage from Augustine:
We speak of God in many ways—as great, good, wise, blessed, true,
and whatever else does not seem unworthily said of him. Nonetheless, God is identical with his greatness, which is his wisdom (since
he is not great by virtue of quantity, but by virtue of power); and he is
identical with his goodness, which is his wisdom and his greatness;
and he is identical with his truth, which is all of these things. For in
him it is not one thing to be blessed and another to be great, or wise,
or true, or to be good, or to be altogether himself. (De Trinitate 6.7.8)
Given Augustine’s enormous influence on the development of medieval
philosophy, it is not surprising that similar passages pervade the works of
Anselm and Aquinas. Consider, for example, the following passage from
Anselm’s Proslogion:
Life, wisdom, and all the rest are not parts of you, but all are one, and
each of them is the whole of what you are and the whole of what the
others are. (Proslogion 18)
Again, here is a passage from Aquinas’s Summa Contra Gentiles:
In every simple thing, its being and that which it is are the same.
For if the one were not the other, simplicity would be removed. As
we have shown, however, God is absolutely simple. Hence, in God,
being good is not anything distinct from him; he is his goodness.
(Summa Contra Gentiles, I 38)
As these passages help to make clear, the traditional doctrine of divine
simplicity can be expressed in terms of the requirements it places on divine
predications. At least as understood by the medievals, what this doctrine
tells us is that if a predication such as “God is good” is true, then there
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exists an entity, God’s goodness, that is identical with God; likewise, if “God
is powerful” is true, then God’s power exists and is identical with God; and
so on for other such true divine predications. Generalizing, therefore, we
can (as I noted in the introduction) state the traditional doctrine of divine
simplicity as follows:
(DS): If an intrinsic predication of the form “God is F” is true, then
God’s F-ness exists and is identical with God.
Stated in this way, the doctrine seems to presuppose the existence of entities
corresponding to abstract singular terms such as ‘God’s goodness,’ ‘God’s
power,’ and ‘God’s wisdom.’7 So stated, therefore, the doctrine appears to
be inconsistent with certain forms of nominalism—namely, all those which
deny that expressions of the form ‘a’s F-ness’ are genuinely referring devices.8 Even so, it must be noted that, strictly speaking, the doctrine is silent
about the nature of the entities referred to by these expressions. For it says
nothing about the ontological category to which they belong. How, then,
are we to understand such entities?
It is natural to suppose that the answer must be ‘as properties.’ After all,
Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas all suppose that, at least in the case of
creatures, some true (intrinsic) predications of the form “a is F” entail the
existence of properties, which can in turn be referred to by expressions of
the form ‘a’s F-ness.’ To cite just one text as evidence, consider the following
passage from Anselm’s Monologion in which he compares the justice of a
human being to the justice of God.
A human being cannot be his justice, though he can have his justice.
For the same reason, a just human being is not understood as being
his justice (existens iustitia), but as having his justice. By contrast, it
is not properly said that the supreme nature has its justice, but is
its justice. Hence when the supreme nature is called just, is it properly understood as being its justice, rather than as having its justice.9
(Monologion 16)
Here Anselm tells us that if an individual human being, say Socrates, is
truly said to be just, this is because he exemplifies justice, which is a property
distinct from him. Evidently, therefore, Anselm takes the truth of creaturely
predications such as “Socrates is just” to entail the existence of Socrates’
justice, where this entity is to be understood as a property. But if expressions of the form ‘a’s F-ness’ refer to properties in the case of creatures, why
should they behave any diﬀerently in the case of God? To the extent that
medieval thinkers suppose that creaturely predications imply the existence
of properties, therefore, it is natural to suppose they do so on the basis of
a perfectly general account of predication (and abstract reference)—what I
earlier called ‘the property account’:
(PA): If an intrinsic predication of the form “a is F” is true, then a’s F-ness
exists, where this entity is to be understood as a property.
The plausibility of attributing PA to the medievals is reinforced by the
intuitive nature of PA itself. For this account just appears to make explicit
something that, as contemporary philosophers, we often take for granted.
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We habitually speak as if for any true predication whatsoever, there is a
subject of predication (e.g., Socrates), there is a property (e.g., justice or
Socrates’ justice), and the subject exemplifies the property (e.g., Socrates
is just).10
In light of the foregoing, there seems to be good reason initially to
accept a property interpretation of divine simplicity—that is to say, one
that combines the doctrine as stated at DS with the property account at
PA. Of course, interpreting the doctrine in this way has the immediate
consequence that God is identical with each of his properties, and hence
is himself a property. But this consequence, as we shall see, is one that
most contemporary defenders of simplicity are willing to accept.
2. Property Interpretations of Simplicity
Perhaps no one has done more to highlight the apparent absurdity of the
property interpretation of divine simplicity than Alvin Plantinga. Indeed,
ever since the publication of his 1980 monograph, Does God Have a Nature?,
the literature on divine simplicity has been dominated by the question of
whether it is coherent to say that God is identical with each of his (intrinsic) properties. As Plantinga points out, there are at least two reasons for
thinking it is not:
In the first place, if God is identical with each of his properties, then
each of his properties is identical with each of his properties, so that
he has but one property. . . . In the second place, if God is identical with each of his properties, then since each of his properties is a
property, he is a property—a self-exemplifying property. (Plantinga
1980, p. 47)11
Although the first consideration “seems flatly incompatible with the obvious fact that God has several properties,” it is the diﬃculty raised by the
second consideration that Plantinga regards as “truly monumental”:
No property could have created the world; no property could be
omniscient, or indeed, know anything at all. If God is a property,
then he isn’t a person but a mere abstract object; he has no knowledge, awareness, power, love or life. So taken, the simplicity doctrine
seems to be an utter mistake. (Plantinga 1980, p. 47)
It is hard to disagree with Plantinga’s conclusion here, at least on the assumption that properties are abstract objects. For no such object could be a
person, much less one responsible for the creation of the universe, capable
of love, knowledge, power, awareness, and life.
2.1 Properties as Universals. I think it is fair to say that most philosophers
writing about simplicity since Plantinga have assumed that the apparent
absurdity of the doctrine derives entirely from the specific conception of
properties in terms of which Plantinga interprets it. As is clear from the
passages just quoted, Plantinga espouses a form of Platonic realism—that
is, a conception of properties according to which they are a specific type
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of abstract entity, namely, universals. Most defenders of simplicity would
admit that this conception raises problems for the doctrine. But insofar as
it represents only one of several respectable ways of conceiving of properties, they assume that these problems can be avoided merely by adopting
some other conception of properties.
Although it would be possible to develop a version of the property
interpretation in terms of some form of Aristotelian (as opposed to Platonic) realism—according to which properties are concrete (as opposed
to abstract) universals—no one to my knowledge has attempted to do
so. Nor is it hard to see why. The claim that God is a concrete universal
seems just as problematic as the claim that he is an abstract universal. For
by their very nature, universals are multiply exemplifiable entities—that
is to say, entities capable of being exemplified by more than one thing at
a time; and concrete universals are typically regarded as constituents of
the concrete particulars that possess them.12 Thus, interpreting simplicity
in terms of concrete universals would have the consequence that God is
both multiply exemplifiable and capable of serving as a constituent of
other concrete particulars. But each of these consequences seems absurd.
Certainly there are one-many relations in which God stands to concrete
particulars; and we may, if we like, follow the neo-Platonists in speaking
of such relations in terms of participation. But it doesn’t follow that God
can literally be multiply exemplified, for only universals can stand in
that relation to particulars and no concrete particular is a universal.13 Nor
would it seem plausible, at least on the classical conception of deity, to
say that God is a constituent of anything else. For according to the classical conception, God is a transcendent being.14 Evidently, therefore, if we
are going to defend the coherence of identifying God with a property, we
must formulate a theory of properties according to which at least some
properties are both concrete and individual.
2.2 Properties as Concrete Individuals. As far as I know the first person
in the contemporary literature to adopt a version of the properties-asconcrete-individuals interpretation is William Mann (1982). Although
his specific version of this interpretation faces seriously diﬃculties, it
nonetheless suggests a general type of interpretation that can seem quite
promising.
According to Mann, when medievals such as Aquinas identify God with
his nature, his goodness, and his power, they do so with the intention of
identifying God with what he calls property instances—that is, concrete individuals that stand in a special relation (namely, instantiation) to the Platonic
universals of which they are the instances.15 As Mann sees it, therefore, we
must distinguish between two very diﬀerent kinds of property—abstract
universals such as goodness, power, and wisdom, and concrete individual properties such as God’s goodness, God’s power, and God’s wisdom,
which are instances of the corresponding universals.16 With this distinction
in hand, he suggests that the medieval doctrine of simplicity requires the
identification of God with properties of only the latter sort. Thus, if God
and one of his creatures, such as Socrates, are both good, it will be true that
they both stand in relation to the same universal, goodness. At the same
time, however, it will also be true that they stand in this relation by virtue
of possessing their own numerically distinct, concrete individual instances
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of goodness—namely, God’s goodness in the case of God (which is identical
with God), and Socrates’ goodness in the case of Socrates (which is distinct
from him). But, of course, if this is correct, then the medieval doctrine can
preserve the intuition that God is a concrete individual.
Although initially promising, the property-instance interpretation of
simplicity must ultimately be rejected. As is often pointed out, one of the
chief motivations historically for the doctrine of divine simplicity is divine
aseity—that is, the view that God is an absolutely independent being, and
hence exists entirely from himself (a se).17 But if God is a property instance,
he will lack aseity. For property instances, at least as Mann conceives them,
are dependent for their existence on the universals of which they are the
instances. Thus, if God is identical with his goodness, even where his goodness is conceived as a property instance, God will depend for his existence
on something distinct from himself, namely, the universal property of
which his goodness is an instance, being good; and the same will be true for
each of his other property instances.18
It might be thought that this objection could be avoided, and the
properties-as-concrete-individuals interpretation upheld, if we simply
denied the Platonic aspect of Mann’s view, and conceived of properties in terms of what are now standardly called ‘tropes.’ Like property
instances, tropes are concrete individuals, but unlike them, they are not
generally thought to require the existence of universals to explain their
similarity or “sameness.” Thus, if it is asked in virtue of what two (or
more) tropes of whiteness resemble each other, the answer will typically appeal to nothing more than the tropes themselves. Just in virtue
of being the concrete individuals they are, they resemble each other with
respect to color. End of story.19
Would a trope-theoretic version of the property interpretation fare
any better than Mann’s property-instance interpretation?20 The answer, it
seems to me, is ‘no.’ For although identifying God with a trope would
avoid making him dependent on a universal (since according to most trope
theorists, there are no universals), it would not succeed in making him
absolutely independent. For even tropes, as they are usually conceived,
are dependent beings—that is, concrete individuals depending for their
existence on something distinct from themselves (namely, the subjects to
which they belong). But, then, even if God is identified with a trope, he
will lack aseity. Of course, one could reject the usual conception of tropes,
maintaining instead that tropes have a measure of independence—that
they are (in A. J. Ayer’s memorable phrase) “junior substances.” But even
if this proposal would resolve the worry about aseity, it would still face
a serious diﬃculty—indeed it would face what I take to be the chief difficulty for any every version of the property interpretation. Regardless of
how else they are conceived, tropes are properties. But, then, even if they
are conceived of as independent beings, they will still be distinguished
from substances proper—“senior substances”—insofar as properties can
(whereas as concrete particular substances cannot) be exemplified—i.e.,
possessed, instantiated, or had.
There is one final step that the defender of the property interpretation
could take—namely, to reject that properties in general, and tropes in particular, must be conceived of as entities capable of being exemplified. At
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one time I thought this was just the sort of response required to make
sense of divine simplicity. But I am now convinced that it is mistaken—or
at least misguided in the current dialectical context. For unlike the other
features of properties we have been considering (abstractness, universality,
and dependency), the capacity for being exemplified is generally taken by
critics of the doctrine to be constitutive of, and hence inseparable from, the
concept of a property.21 Nor is it hard to see why. This conception of properties is precisely the one lying behind the traditional view that properties
are entities categorially distinct from substances. According to the traditional view, both properties and substances may be the subject of further
properties, and hence can both be said to exemplify other things. But only
substances are such that they cannot be exemplified by anything else.22
In light of the foregoing, we may state the fundamental diﬃculty for
any version of the property interpretation succinctly as follows:
(1) God is a substance.
(2) No substance can be a property (i.e., an exemplifiable).
∴ (3) God cannot be identical with a property (no matter how entities of
this type are conceived).
The first premise, I take it, is non-negotiable, since according to traditional
theism, God is a person, and persons are substances.23 But the second premise would seem to be non-negotiable as well, since it seems to be central
tenet of our very conception of properties that, whatever else they are, they
are not substances.
2.3 Properties as Substances. As it turns out, however, a number of people
have attempted to defend the property interpretation precisely by rejecting premise 2 of the argument above. Katherin Rogers (1996), for example,
has suggested that even if there is a categorial divide between substances
and certain types of properties, which she calls qualities or traits, there
is no such division separating substances and what medievals such as
Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas call actions—a special type of concrete
individual that, at least in the case of creatures, inheres in or is exemplified
by substances.24 But, then, provided we identify God only with “actions”
of this specific sort, a version of the property interpretation can be upheld—or so Rogers’s discussion suggests.25
Again, Brian Leftow (1990) has presented an argument which suggests
that the failure of the traditional conception of properties and substances,
and hence the falsity of premise 2, is precisely the lesson to be drawn from
the doctrine of divine simplicity. Suppose that divine simplicity does entail that God is a property. Even so, Leftow argues, it does not follow (as
Plantinga suggests) that God is an abstract object and hence not a person,
even if (like Plantinga) we are initially inclined to accept a form of Platonic
realism. If God is identical with a property P, then admittedly it follows
that there is only one thing where we might originally have thought there
were two (namely, God and P). Again, this single thing must have all the
characteristics that God really has and all the characteristics that P really
has. But as Leftow rightly points out, these characteristics may constitute
only a proper subset of those originally associated with God and P. Thus, if
God is a substance and P is a property, it may turn out that some substances
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(namely, God) are abstract entities capable of being exemplified (in which
case Plantinga’s conclusion would be right, God is not a person). But then
again, it may also turn out that some properties (namely, P) are concrete
particular substances and hence incapable of exemplification (in which
case there is no problem with saying that God is a person). For obvious
reasons, proponents of the property interpretation may well opt for the
latter conclusion.26
By far the most explicit attempt to challenge the traditional conception
of properties and substances occurs in William Vallicella’s (1992) treatment
of divine simplicity. Vallicella grants that something is a property if and
only if it can be exemplified. He also grants that substances are such that
they cannot be multiply exemplified nor exemplified by anything distinct
from themselves. As he points out, however, the conjunction of these two
claims is consistent with the view that substances are capable of being
exemplified by themselves, and hence of also qualifying as properties. Vallicella recommends, therefore, that we identify God with his properties and
then construe God’s properties as entities that can be exemplified only by
themselves. Here again, the motivation is clearly to uphold a version of the
property interpretation.27
As I see it, none of these discussions provides anything like compelling grounds for abandoning the traditional conception of properties. For
while they each recommend abandoning the conception, they oﬀer us
little in the way of independent motivation for doing so.28 Without some
such motivation, however, the strategy they adopt for making sense of
simplicity appears not only extreme, but also extremely ad hoc. Indeed, it
would seem that any account of simplicity that could render the doctrine
coherent without giving up the traditional conception of properties would
be preferable to them.29
For all these reasons, I conclude that if we want to make sense of divine
simplicity, our best hope is not to abandon the traditional conception of
properties, but rather to abandon the attempt to interpret the doctrine in
terms of properties at all.
3. Alternative Interpretations of Simplicity
Obviously, if we are going to avoid the diﬃculties associated with the property interpretation, we must find some alternative way of understanding
locutions such as ‘God’s nature,’ ‘God’s goodness,’ and ‘God’s power’—
one according to which they refer something other than properties. But to
what other type of entities can they plausibly be taken to refer?
There is very little discussion of this question in the contemporary
literature. In fact, there appear to be only two suggestions that have been
developed—namely, (a) that abstract singular terms refer to states of affairs, and (b) that they refer to metaphysical constituents of particulars.
Although neither suggestion is ultimately acceptable, both are worth
exploring briefly, since the reasons for their failure are instructive: they
point the way not only to an adequate interpretation of simplicity, but
also to the conditions that must be met by any adequate interpretation.
3.1 The State-of-aﬀairs Interpretation. States of aﬀairs provide what is,
perhaps, the most obvious suggestion for a type of entity (other than
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properties) that could serve as the referents for expressions of the form ‘a’s
F-ness.’ Plantinga (1980), who seems to have been the first to consider this
suggestion in the context of simplicity, develops it as follows:
Suppose we consider Socrates and wisdom: we can distinguish
Socrates from wisdom and each of them from the state of aﬀairs
Socrates’ being wise—a state of aﬀairs that obtains or is actual if and
only if Socrates displays wisdom. Perhaps we could refer to Socrates’
being wise by the locutions ‘Socrates’ having wisdom’ or ‘the wisdom
of Socrates’ or even ‘Socrates’ wisdom.’ And when Aquinas speaks of
God’s life or God’s wisdom, perhaps we may take him as speaking
of the state of aﬀairs consisting in God’s being wise and having life.
(Plantinga 1980, p. 48)
In eﬀect, Plantinga is suggesting here that, instead of interpreting simplicity in terms of a property account of predication and abstract reference, we
interpret it in terms of a “state-of-aﬀairs account” of such phenomena:
(SA): If an intrinsic predication of the form “a is F” is true, then a’s
F-ness exists, where this entity is to be understood as a state of
aﬀairs.
There is one respect in which Plantinga claims the state-of-aﬀairs interpretation is clearly superior to any form of property interpretation. The
state-of-aﬀairs interpretation can (whereas the property interpretation
cannot) immediately deflect the diﬃculty of explaining how God’s goodness, power, wisdom, and so on can all be identical with one another. For
as he says “while it is obviously absurd to claim that wisdom and power
are the very same property, it is not obviously absurd to hold that God’s
being wise is the same state of aﬀairs as God’s being powerful.”30 Even so,
Plantinga thinks, the state-of-aﬀairs must ultimately be rejected. For states
of aﬀairs are abstract objects and hence no more capable than properties
of creating the universe or possessing knowledge, awareness, power, love,
or life.31 Again, states of aﬀairs are essentially such as to obtain or fail to
obtain, whereas substances (and in particular, persons) are not.
In response, it is tempting to adopt the strategy suggested earlier by
Leftow (1990), noting that even if the identification of God with a state of
aﬀairs might be taken to show that God is a certain type of abstract object,
it might just as well be taken to show that certain states of aﬀairs (such as
God’s being wise or God’s being powerful) are concrete particular substances.
Assuming we opt for the latter conclusion, however, the objection would
seem to be avoided.
Note, however, that adopting this line of response requires us to reject
the view that there is any categorial diﬀerence between states of aﬀairs
and substances—just as the earlier adoption of this strategy required us
to reject the view that there is a categorial diﬀerence between properties
and substances. Those, like Plantinga, who start oﬀ conceiving of states of
aﬀairs as abstracta will, no doubt, find the rejection of this sort of dualism
implausible—indeed, just as implausible as the rejection of that between
properties and substances. Even so, there are resources for responding
to this claim that weren’t available in the case of properties. For states
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of aﬀairs can, even if properties cannot, be conceived of in a way that is
amenable to their identification with substances. As is well known, David
Armstrong has argued that the particulars of ordinary experience (what
he calls “thick particulars”) are nothing but concrete states of aﬀairs.32
In doing so, he appears to be suggesting that we conceive of substances
roughly along the lines of what other philosophers call facts, events, or
property exemplifications. But there is nothing obviously absurd about identifying particular substances with entities of this sort (or at least we may
assume this is true). But, then, what objection can there be to conceiving
of God in this way as well?
The short answer is that such a conception of God conflicts with the
standard understanding of divine simplicity. As we have seen, this understanding requires that God lacks any metaphysical parts, constituents, or
complexity whatsoever. But concrete states of aﬀairs, as they are typically
conceived, are structured complexes having constituents.33 Thus, an ordinary (thick) particular such as Socrates, on Armstrong’s view, is a structured
complex whose constituents are a bare substratum (or “thin particular”)
and various properties (namely, those that make up Socrates’ nature). But,
then, evidently, an absolutely simple God cannot be identified with a state
of aﬀairs of this sort.
Of course, one could always try to modify the standard concrete-state-ofaﬀairs conception in order to handle cases of simple substances. But even
if successful, it would still seem that no state-of-aﬀairs interpretation could
succeed in rendering the doctrine of divine simplicity coherent. For this
sort of interpretation is based on the general account of predication and abstract reference at SA, which takes all expressions of the form ‘a’s F-ness’ to
refer to states of aﬀairs. As we have seen, however, traditional proponents
of divine simplicity—thinkers such as Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas—
all assume that, at least in the case of creatures, expressions of the form ‘a’s
F-ness’ can refer to properties. Thus, ‘Socrates’ justice,’ they say, refers to a
quality that is distinct from and exemplified by Socrates. In order to make
sense of this assumption, the defender of the state-of-aﬀairs interpretation
would have to allow that, at least in the case of creatures, states of aﬀairs
can be identified with properties. But that seems absurd on any conception
of states of aﬀairs: no state of aﬀairs, whether simple or complex, can be
exemplified, whereas properties are by nature exemplifiable.
This last criticism brings us to an important respect in which both the
property and the state-of-aﬀairs interpretations fail. As we can now see,
both interpretations take for granted what might be called a ‘single-category
account’ of predication and abstract reference—that is to say, an account according to which the entities such as God’s justice and Socrates’ justice belong
to a single ontological category. All versions of the property interpretation
take for granted that such entities belong to the category of property, whereas
all versions of the state-of-aﬀairs interpretation take for granted they belong
to the category of state of aﬀairs. The problem, however, is that the doctrine
of divine simplicity cannot be interpreted solely in terms of either properties or states of aﬀairs—or indeed in terms of entities belonging to any
single ontological category. As our earlier discussion of Augustine, Anselm,
and Aquinas makes clear, the doctrine must be understood in terms of an
account of predication and abstract reference that allows for expressions
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of the form ‘a’s F-ness’ to refer both to properties (as in the case of Socrates’
justice) and to concrete particular substances (as in the case of God’s justice).
But no single-category account of predication can do that, since no single
ontological category can include both substances and properties.
In the end, therefore, Plantinga appears to have been right—though
not for the reasons he suggests—to suppose that the state-of-aﬀairs interpretation is just as unacceptable as the property interpretation. Indeed,
summarizing our results to this point, we may say that no interpretation
that presupposes a single-category account of predication can possibly be
used to make sense of divine simplicity—regardless of whether the single
category in question is taken to be property, state of aﬀairs, or any other.
3.2 The Constituent Interpretation. If we want to avoid the problems associated with interpretations of simplicity that take for granted a single-category
theory of predication, we must adopt a new account of predication—one
that allows us to characterize the referents of abstract expressions in a way
that is consistent with their belonging to diﬀerent ontological categories (in
particular, the categories of substance and property). But what must such an
account look like? In answering this question, we can do no better than to
start with an account suggested by Nicholas Wolterstorﬀ (1991).
According to Wolterstorﬀ, contemporary diﬃculties with divine simplicity all stem from the fact that we now approach the doctrine from the
perspective of a theoretical framework that is foreign to the one in which
it was traditionally understood. Although Wolterstorﬀ doesn’t explicitly
characterize the diﬀerences in terms of what these frameworks say about
predication and abstract reference, it is clear that this is how he’s thinking of
them.34 Consider, for example, how he contrasts the two frameworks with
respect to what each says about the possession of natures or essences:
It has become habitual for us twentieth-century philosophers, when
thinking of essences, to think of things having essences, and to think of
these essences as certain properties or sets of properties. An essence is
thus for us an abstract entity. For a medieval, I suggest, an essence or
nature was just as concrete [and individual] as that of which it is the
nature. . . . Naturally the medieval will speak of something as having
a certain nature. But the having here is to be understood as having as
one of its constituents. Very much of the diﬀerence between medieval
and contemporary ontology hangs on these two diﬀerent construals
of “having.” Whereas for the medievals, having an essence was, having
an essence as one of its constituents, for us, having an essence is, having
an essence as one of its properties: exemplifying it. (Wolterstorﬀ 1991,
pp. 541–42)
Wolterstorﬀ ’s point in the passage seems to be this: whereas contemporary
philosophers conceive of predication in terms of subjects exemplifying
properties, the medievals conceive of predication in terms of subjects
possessing constituents. Thus, when contemporary philosophers speak
of essences (or more generally, of the referents of abstract expressions
of the form ‘a’s F-ness’), what they have in mind are abstract (universal)
properties. By contrast, when the medievals speak of such entities, what
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they have in mind are concrete (individual) constituents. As Wolterstorﬀ
sees it, therefore, contemporary philosophers approach the doctrine of
divine simplicity from the perspective of a property (or property-asuniversals) account of predication and abstract reference, whereas the
medievals approach it from the perspective of what might be called ‘the
constituent account’:
(CA): If an intrinsic predication of the form “a is F” is true, then a’s
F-ness exists, where this entity is to be understood as a metaphysical constituent of a.
Wolterstorﬀ ’s diagnosis of contemporary diﬃculties with simplicity
seems plausible in light of our earlier discussion. The property account
at PA is, as I’ve suggested, at the root of most contemporary puzzlement
over the doctrine. Moreover, his suggestion that the medievals interpret
the doctrine in terms of CA (rather than PA) seems promising. For unlike
all the other accounts we’ve considered, CA characterizes the referents
of abstract expressions of the form ‘a’s F-ness’ in terms of an ontological
type—namely, constituent—whose further specification can include both
substances and properties. Thus, the view that results from interpreting
simplicity in terms of CA—namely, that God is identical with each of his
constituents, and hence has only one constituent, himself—seems perfectly
coherent (at least if we allow for the notion of an “improper constituent,”
on the model of an improper part in mereology). Note, too, that this view
is consistent with the claim that expressions of the form ‘a’s F-ness’ refer
to properties in the case of creatures. For there is no obvious absurdity in
saying that creatures have properties among their (proper) constituents,
whereas God does not. Indeed, insofar as CA is neutral with regard to the
nature of the entities introduced by expressions like ‘a’s justice,’ it clearly
allows for a multiple-category theory of predication according to which,
in some cases an expression of this sort refers to a property (namely, in the
case of a creature such as Socrates), and in other cases it refers to a concrete
individual (namely, in the case of God).
Of all the interpretations of divine simplicity currently on oﬀer in
the literature, Wolterstorﬀ ’s has done more, I suspect, than any other to
convince people that the doctrine is coherent.35 Even so, it seems to me
that there is a respect in which the theory of predication and abstract
reference underlying it is unacceptably incomplete. For even if it makes
sense to say that expressions such as ‘Socrates’ justice’ or ‘Socrates’
nature’ refer to metaphysical constituents of Socrates, CA gives us no
principled basis for distinguishing these constituents. But that seems
problematic. After all, Socrates’ nature is not just any constituent of
Socrates, but that constituent in virtue of which he is human; likewise,
Socrates’ justice is not just any constituent of him, but that constituent in
virtue of which he is just (as opposed to, say, human or powerful); and so
on for the referents of every other such abstract expression. In general,
we need a way of distinguishing these sorts of constituents, if only because in many cases they really are distinct. According to Aquinas, for
example, the referents of ‘Socrates’ nature’ and ‘Socrates’ justice’ are not
only distinct from each other but also distinct from Socrates. But it is
hard to see how this can be explained unless we add something like the
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following: although ‘Socrates’ nature’ and ‘Socrates’ justice’ both refer
to constituents of Socrates, ‘Socrates’ nature’ refers to that constituent
which makes him human, whereas ‘Socrates’ justice’ refers to that constituent which makes him just.
Note that the same sort of problem arises in the case of God as well.
For even if God is absolutely simple, and hence identical with each of
his constituents, we can still draw a conceptual distinction between God’s
nature and his justice or power (for surely expressions such as ‘God’s nature,’ ‘God’s justice,’ and ‘God’s power’ are distinct in sense, even if not in
reference). But here again, it seems that we can draw the relevant sort of
distinction only if we characterize the constituents in question as follows:
God’s nature is that constituent in virtue of which he is divine, and his justice
and power, respectively, are those constituents in virtue of which he is just
and powerful. But to describe God’s constituents in this way is already
to invoke a further notion—namely, that of a truthmaker. For as already
hinted at in the case of creatures, to say that a given entity is that in virtue
of which something is F is just to say it is that which makes it F, or alternatively, that which “makes it true” that it is F.
Evidently, therefore, in order to remove the incompleteness associated
with Wolterstorﬀ ’s constituent account, we must revise CA along the following lines:
(CA*): If an intrinsic predication of the form “a is F” is true, then a’s Fness exists, where this entity is to be understood as that (proper
or improper) constituent of a which makes true “a is F.”
Once we revise the constituent account in this way, so as to make explicit
reference to truthmakers, it becomes possible to distinguish (at least conceptually) the referents of ‘Socrates’ nature’ and ‘Socrates’ justice,’ as well
as the referents of ‘God’s nature’ and ‘God’s justice.’ For according to CA*,
the referents of abstract expressions must identified in relation to the predications they make true. But, then, wherever the predications are distinct,
there will be grounds for at least a conceptual distinction of the referents.
As we have seen, a basis for this sort of distinction is just what was
needed to remove the incompleteness associated with Wolterstorﬀ ’s constituent interpretation of divine simplicity. Once it is introduced, however, his
interpretation no longer seems objectionable. For now the claim that God
is identical with his nature will just amount to the claim that he is identical
with that constituent which makes him divine—i.e., with his divine-making
constituent; again, the claim that he is identical with his justice will amount
to the claim that he is identical with his just-making constituent; and so on
for every other such theistic identity claim. Notice, moreover, that the interpretation also enables us to make sense of the claim that God’s constituents
are each identical with one another. For now to say this will just amount
to saying that God’s divine-making constituent is identical with his goodmaking constituent, and indeed that God has only one constituent, himself,
that makes true each of the (intrinsic) predications that can be truly made
about him.
Even without further comment, it should be clear that the revised constituent interpretation goes considerable distance toward rendering the
doctrine of divine simplicity coherent. It does not succumb to any of the
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problems plaguing the other contemporary interpretations of simplicity.
Nor is there is anything obviously absurd about saying that God is himself the truthmaker for each of the true (intrinsic) predications that can
be made about him. I will have much more to say about the coherence
of this sort of interpretation in the next section of the paper. Before I can
do so, however, I need make clear that in moving from the original to the
revised constituent interpretation of simplicity, we have in fact introduced
a new type of interpretation—one whose acceptability has nothing to do
with constituents.
3.3 The Truthmaker Interpretation. Although the revised constituent interpretation makes reference to both constituents and truthmakers, it is, I
now want to suggest, the notion of truthmaking (rather than constituency)
that is really doing the important theoretical work. That this is the case is
clear from the fact that the revised constituent interpretation at CA* can be
re-stated without any reference to constituents whatsoever without any
loss of plausibility. Thus, consider the following “truthmaker account” of
predication and abstract reference:
(TA): If an intrinsic predication of the form “a is F” is true, then a’s
F-ness exists, where this entity is to be understood as the truthmaker for “a is F.”
Clearly, what we have here is exactly like CA* except that it drops the
requirement that truthmakers be constituents of any sort. Note, however,
that when we interpret the doctrine of simplicity in terms of it, we arrive
at the same view that makes the revised constituent interpretation seem
so promising—namely, that God is identical with the truthmakers for each
of his (intrinsic) predications. The only diﬀerence is that we now arrive at
this view directly, without any intermediate reference to constituents.
The fact that the truthmaker interpretation of simplicity can be adequately stated without any reference to constituents (but not vice versa),
confirms that it is the notion of truthmaking (rather than constituency) that
is crucial for interpreting the doctrine of simplicity. Indeed, it suggests
that to the extent the revised constituent interpretation succeeds as an
interpretation, it does so precisely because it is a species of the truthmaker
interpretation. But if this is correct, there would appear to be no reason
to appeal to constituents in the first place, especially if one thinks, as I
do, that it is the truthmaker account, rather than any form of constituent
account, that represents the actual views of medievals such as Augustine,
Anselm, and Aquinas on predication and abstract reference.36
We have now arrived at what I take to be the only type of interpretation that can succeed in making sense of divine simplicity—namely, the
truthmaker interpretation. Of course, I have yet to say anything substantive
about the notion of a truthmaker itself. The notion will already be familiar
to many, insofar as it is a widely accepted part of much contemporary discussion in metaphysics. Even so, a few clarificatory comments are in order.
Despite the misleading connotations suggested by its name, the notion of
a truthmaker is not to be understood in terms of (eﬃcient) causality. On the
contrary, it is to be understood in terms of broadly logical necessitation—as
is evident from the fact that contemporary philosophers habitually speak
of truthmakers as entailing the truth of certain statements or predications.37
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Although this way of speaking strikes me as perfectly acceptable, it is sometimes objected to on the grounds that only truths (or truthbearers) can entail
one another. To remove any possibility for misunderstanding, therefore, I
oﬀer the following (partial) analysis of truthmaker in its place:
(TM): If an entity E is a truthmaker for a predication P, then E is necessarily (or essentially) such that P.38
In line with TM, we may speak of the relationship between a particular
truthmaker and the predication it makes true in terms of necessitation
rather than entailment. Here again, however, it must be kept in mind that
the necessitation in question is not causal but broadly logical.
It is important to note that TM is intended to provide only a partial
analysis of the notion of truthmaking. This point is important because a
complete analysis of truthmaking in terms of entailment or necessitation
would lead to obvious absurdities, including the absurdity that necessary
truths—such as “2 + 2 = 4”—can have any existing thing whatsoever as
their truthmakers. But if TM does not provide a complete analysis of the
notion of truthmaking, the question arises as to what else is required for
something to qualify as a truthmaker? This is a diﬃcult question, one to
which diﬀerent answers have been given in the literature. Some, such as
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002), claim that the notion of a truthmaker is
primitive, and hence does not admit of non-circular analysis or definition.39
Others, however, attempt to define truthmaker in terms of more familiar
notions. Thus, Greg Restall (1996) suggests that we can define truthmaking
in terms of the notion of non-classical or “relevant” entailment.40 Again,
Barry Smith (1999 and 2002) claims that we can define it in terms of representation or projection, a notion that he describes as the dual of necessitation.41 Although I myself prefer the primitive truthmaking account, we
needn’t decide here among the competing views. For our purposes, it will
suﬃce merely to adopt the following principle: if an entity E necessitates
the truth of a predication P, then E is at least a candidate—perhaps even a
prima facie good candidate—for P’s truthmaker.
It should be clear, in light of the foregoing, that to characterize an entity as a truthmaker is to characterize it in terms of a certain metaphysical
function or role—that of necessitating (in a certain way) the truth of the
predications it makes true. In this respect, ‘truthmaker’ is similar to other
sorts of functional characterization one finds in philosophy. Just as functional characterizations in the philosophy of mind, for example, enable us
to prescind from the precise nature of mental states (such as pain), so too
the characterization of an entity as a truthmaker enables us to prescind
from the precise ontological category to which it belongs.
All of this is, of course, directly relevant to the doctrine of divine simplicity. For as we’ve seen, insofar as the doctrine requires us to identify God
with his nature, goodness, power, justice, and so on, it must be interpreted
in light of a theory of predication and abstract reference that permits the
referents of abstract expressions of the form ‘a’s F-ness’ to refer to entities
belonging to the category of substance (namely, God himself). Given what
we have said about truthmakers, however, we can see that TA is just such
a theory. In taking the referents of abstract expressions to be truthmakers,
it places no restriction whatsoever on the nature or ontological category to
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which they belong. For the same reason, the referents of such expressions
can, at least in principle, be identified not only with concrete particulars in
the case of God, but also with properties in the case of creatures.
4. The Truthmaker Interpretation Defended
If my argument to this point has been successful, it will be clear that the
truthmaker interpretation of simplicity provides us with an account of
the doctrine that is prima facie coherent. In this final section, I complete
my defense of the truthmaker interpretation by responding to some of
the most obvious and worrisome objections it faces. I then conclude by
arguing that, in addition to being coherent, the truthmaker interpretation
provides us with the only coherent interpretation of simplicity.
4.1 The Truthmaker Interpretation and Contingency. According to the truthmaker interpretation, God is identical with the truthmakers for each of the
true (intrinsic) predications that can be made about him. Thus, if God is
divine, he is identical with that which makes him divine; if he is good,
he is identical with that which makes him good; and so on in every other
such case. Now, since nothing can be regarded as identical with anything
other than itself, this interpretation just amounts to the claim that God is
the truthmaker for each of the predications in question.
This interpretation of simplicity seems promising if we focus on predications such as “God is divine,” “God is good,” and “God is powerful.”
For in each of these cases, God can plausibly be regarded as their truthmaker. According to classical theism, God is essentially divine, good, and
powerful. That is to say, he is divine, good, and powerful in all possible
worlds in which he exists, and hence is such as to necessitate the truth
of the corresponding predications. But this, as we have seen, is all that’s
required to make him a candidate for their truthmaker.
A problem arises, however, when we turn our attention to predications
like “God knows that human beings exist” or “God chooses to create the
universe.” These predications certainly appear to be intrinsic. According
to the truthmaker interpretation, therefore, God must be their truthmaker.
But do we really want to say that? To do so would require our also saying
that God alone is suﬃcient for their truth, and hence that the truths themselves are cases of essential predication—which, in turn, entails that God
could not have failed to know or will the things he actually knows or will.
Such a conclusion will no doubt strike many theists as absurd.
There are two things to be said in response to this objection. The first
is that, it is not at all clear that the objection goes through. Granted, if
we assume that predications like “God knows that human beings exist”
or “God chooses to create the universe” are genuinely intrinsic, then the
truthmaker interpretation will give us no choice but to say that they are
also essential. It is possible, however, to resist this assumption, and to argue instead that such predications are really cases of contingent, extrinsic
predication.42 Indeed, this strategy seems to me not only plausible, but
also the one adopted by Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas.43
The second thing to be said, however, is that strictly speaking, this
objection concerns the plausibility not the coherence of divine simplicity.
There is nothing internally inconsistent—and so nothing absurd in that
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sense—about saying that God could not have known or willed otherwise
than he actually knows or wills. On the contrary, this view seems perfectly
intelligible, and has in fact been defended by a number of classical theists
(including perhaps each of the following: Plato, Plotinus, Abelard, and
Leibniz). No doubt, the view will strike many theists as “absurd” insofar
as it conflicts with other things they take themselves to know about God.
But that is just another way of saying it will strike them as highly implausible. Strictly speaking, therefore, even if the objection goes through, it
doesn’t threaten the basic project that I’ve undertaken here, which is that
of making sense of divine simplicity. While I do hope that what I have to
say will help to shift contemporary discussion of the doctrine away from
questions about its coherence to questions about its plausibility, my central aim here is to defend its coherence.
4.2 The Truthmaker Interpretation and Abstract Reference. There are no
doubt a number of other objections that might be raised against the truthmaker interpretation and more properly concern its coherence. Here I
want to focus on just two, both of which concern TA, the account of predication and abstract reference underlying it.
Objection 1: I have claimed that TA is a categorially neutral account of
predication and abstract reference, and hence that in principle it places
no restriction on the nature of the referents of expressions of the form
‘a’s F-ness.’ Moreover, I have argued that these referents can be plausibly identified with concrete particular substances—indeed, God himself—in the case of God. But is it really possible to say that the referents
of such expressions can also be identified with properties in the case of
creatures, as the traditional doctrine of divine simplicity requires?
Yes, provided we have the right metaphysical account of properties. What
makes it possible—indeed, plausible—to say (e.g.) that ‘God’s justice’ refers
to God himself is that the referent of this expression, on TA, is the truthmaker of an essential predication, “God is just.” Notice, however, that in the
case of creatures, the same sort of expression, (e.g.) ‘Socrates’ justice,’ will
typically refer to the truthmaker of an accidental or contingent predication.
For the same reason, we cannot typically say in this sort of case that the
referent of the expression is a concrete individual. Socrates, for example,
cannot be regarded as the truthmaker for “Socrates is just,” since he does
not even necessitate its truth—or so it would seem. But then what is the
truthmaker in such cases?
As it turns out, there is more than one way to answer this question. David
Armstrong, for example, has argued that the truthmakers for contingent
predications must be regarded as facts (or concrete states of aﬀairs).44 On
this view, the referent for an expression such as ‘Socrates’ justice,’ understood as a device for picking out the truthmaker of “Socrates is just,” will
be the fact that Socrates is wise. Obviously this answer will be of no use if we
want properties to be the referents of such expressions. But this is not the
only answer that can be given. One can also argue, as C. B. Martin does, that
the truthmakers for contingent predications are non-transferable tropes—
that is, concrete individual properties that are essentially dependent on the
subjects of which they are the properties.45 This sort of trope nominalism
seems to me to represent the view of properties most commonly endorsed
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by medieval philosophers.46 If I am right about this, however, then the referent of ‘Socrates’ justice’ can be identified with a property—one such that, in
all possible worlds in which it exists, Socrates exists and is just—despite the
fact that ‘God’s justice’ must be identified with a concrete particular (namely,
God himself).47
Objection 2: Even if it is true in principle, on TA, that expressions of the
form ‘a’s F-ness’ can be taken to refer to entities in diﬀerent ontological
categories (including properties and concrete particulars), it might still
seem deeply problematic, if not absurd, that divine simplicity requires
specific instances of this type of expression, say ‘a’s justice,’ to refer
to entities of such radically diﬀerent kinds as non-transferable tropes
in one context (namely, ‘Socrates’ justice’), and concrete particulars in
another (namely, ‘God’s justice’). After all, predications of the form “a
is just” seem to have the same basic meaning regardless of whether ‘a’
refers to Socrates or to God.
There are three things to be said in response to this objection. First, it must
be emphasized that from the perspective of the truthmaker account, the
form or syntactical type of an expression such as ‘a’s justice’ is irrelevant
to the specific ontological category of its referent. According to TA, an
expression such as ‘a’s justice’ is an expression derived from a nominalization of a simple predication of the form ‘a is F.’ As such it is, as it were,
a kind of technical term whose referential properties must understood in
terms of its relation to the predication from which it derives: it just refers
to whatever makes true its corresponding predications (in this case, ‘a
is just’). In principle, therefore, there is nothing about the expression’s
form or syntactical type which rules out the possibility of its referring to
accidental properties or tropes in one case, and to concrete particulars in
another—provided, of course, that both of these types of entity can plausibly be regarded as playing the role of truthmaker of the relevant type
of predication.48
The second thing to be said is that there are examples, deriving from the
broadly medieval metaphysical framework in which the doctrine of divine
simplicity is formulated, which lend support to the idea that an expression
of a single syntactical type could refer to both accidental tropes and concrete particulars. To take just one such example, suppose we have a kettle
of hot water boiling over an open fire. In that case, each of the following
predications will be true:
(4) The water is hot.
(5) The fire is hot.
Now provided that we are willing to grant the possibility that both fire
and water are substances, as the medievals themselves do, then claim
4 may be regarded as a case of accidental predication, and hence as requiring an accidental trope for its truthmaker, whereas claim 5 may be
regarded as a case of essential predication, and hence as requiring only
a particular substance, the fire, for its truthmaker. But, then, if we follow
TA in inventing abstract nominalizations for their truthmakers, then in
the case of claims 4 and 5 we will end up with expressions of a single
syntactical type, namely, ‘a’s heat,’ which will refer to entities in both the
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relevant ontological categories. Moreover, since these entities play the
same functional role—that of explaining why something is hot—despite
their being of diﬀerent categories, they are rightly said to belong to the
same (functional) kind, heat, and hence to serve as the referents for the
same type of expression.
The third and final thing to be said is that, if we help ourselves to
one further aspect of the medieval metaphysical framework mentioned
above—in particular, a substantive conception of metaphysical kinds
standardly adopted by medieval philosophers—we can see why, even
in the case of God and creatures, it might seem utterly unproblematic
for expressions of the same syntactic type (e.g., ‘a’s justice’) to refer to
both accidental properties and concrete individual substances. According to Aquinas, for example, metaphysical kinds are to be understood in
broadly functional terms: things belong to the metaphysical kinds they
do in virtue of possessing certain powers or capacities (namely, those that
are definitive of their kind). In fact, a thing’s nature, as he understands it,
just is that which grounds its kind-defining powers or capacities.49 Now
in the case of a creature such as Socrates, whose justice can clearly wax
and wane, it is one thing to be human, and another thing to be just. Thus,
Socrates cannot be just solely in virtue of possessing human nature (and
hence the distinctive capacities definitive of the metaphysical kind human
being). On the contrary, in order for him to be just, he must come to actualize certain features of his distinctively human capacities, which will involve the acquisition of certain contingent properties or non-transferable
tropes—say, knowledge and virtue. In the case of God, by contrast, things
are diﬀerent. For unlike humanity, God’s nature, as Aquinas sees it, is
such that its very possession necessitates the actualization of the capacities specific to it—which include the capacities for being perfectly just,
powerful, good, knowledgeable, wise, and so on. Hence, solely in virtue
of possessing his nature, God will not only be just, but also omnipotent,
omniscient, perfectly just, wise, and so on.50
In the end, therefore, there appears to nothing incoherent about saying
that both God and creatures are just, despite the fact that God is identical
with his justice, whereas creatures are distinct from and only accidentally
related to theirs. No doubt, there are other objections that could be raised
to the truthmaker account, and hence to the interpretation of simplicity
that relies on it. But since these are, at least as far as I can tell, the most
powerful and obvious ones—apart from those that can be raised against
truthmaker theory itself, whose coherence I am taking for granted in this
paper51—I conclude that the truthmaker interpretation of simplicity is not
only coherent, but even plausible in certain respects.
4.3 The Only Coherent Interpretation? I have now completed my defense
of the truthmaker interpretation of divine simplicity. Before concluding,
however, I want to indicate briefly why, in addition to making sense of the
doctrine, the interpretation that I have defended also seems to oﬀer the
only possible way of rendering it intelligible.
All the interpretations of simplicity that we have examined other than
the truthmaker interpretation fail because they rely on the wrong account
of predication and abstract reference. From the failure of the property and
states-of-aﬀairs interpretations we learn that the traditional doctrine of
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divine simplicity cannot be made sense of apart from a categorially neutral account of predication and abstract reference. From the failure of the
constituent interpretation, however, we learn that category neutrality is
not suﬃcient to make sense of the doctrine. What is needed is an account
that is both thin enough to preserve the categorial neutrality of referents of
expressions of the form ‘a’s F-ness,’ while at the same time thick enough to
enable us to distinguish such referents when they are either in fact distinct
(as in the case of Socrates’ nature and Socrates’ goodness) or merely conceptually distinct (as in the case of God’s nature and God’s goodness). That is to say,
what is needed is a general theory of predication and abstract reference
that meets each of the following conditions:
(C1): True (intrinsic) predications of the form “a is F” guarantee the
existence of entities (such as God’s justice or Socrates’ justice)
that can be referred to by abstract expressions of the form ‘a’s
F-ness.’
(C2): The entities referred to by such expressions are of a type whose
instances can plausibly be both (i) identified with concrete particular substances (as in the case of God’s justice) and properties
(as in the case of Socrates’ justice); and (ii) distinguished (at least
conceptually) from one another.
Truthmakers, however, appear to be the only type of entity that obviously
meets both of these conditions. We can, if we choose, appeal to such entities directly, as in the case of the truthmaker interpretation of simplicity, or
we can appeal to them indirectly, as in the case of the revised constituent
interpretation. But either way, it appears that we have no choice but to
appeal to them.
I conclude, therefore, that the truthmaker interpretation is not only
suﬃcient for making sense of divine simplicity, but also necessary. Those
who remain unconvinced may take the arguments of this paper as a
challenge either to identify the source of incoherence in the truthmaker
interpretation, or to provide a counterexample to my claim that it is the
only coherent interpretation of simplicity that can be given.
4.4 Conclusion. In this paper, I have argued that the doctrine of divine
simplicity makes sense if—and apparently only if—we are prepared to
interpret it in terms of a truthmaker account of predication. For only interpreted in this way can it meet C1 and C2, the two conditions necessary for
any coherent interpretation of simplicity. I have also argued, however, that
once we interpret the doctrine in terms of a truthmaker account, it turns
out to be not only coherent, but also plausible in certain respects.
If my arguments have been successful, we have, at long last, a way of
resolving the chief contemporary diﬃculty with divine simplicity. Indeed,
if I am right, this diﬃculty does not trace (as Wolterstorﬀ ’s interpretation
suggests) to any fundamental disagreement about whether properties
are constituents, but rather traces (as mine suggests) to a fundamental
disagreement about the ontological commitments of predication and abstract reference. Thus, if contemporary philosophers want to understand
the doctrine of divine simplicity, they need only enter imaginatively into
that theoretical account according to which the entities required for the
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truth of predications and for the referents of their corresponding abstract
expressions are truthmakers. However, once we have entered this framework—and I don’t think this requires too much imagination, given the
central role that truthmaking plays in much contemporary metaphysics—
it turns out that we are in a position not only to appreciate the coherence
of the doctrine of divine simplicity, but also a good bit of medieval metaphysics and philosophy of language as well.52
Purdue University

NOTES
1. Martin 1976, p. 40.
2. Smith 1988, p. 524, n. 3. The locus classicus for contemporary diﬃculties
is Plantinga 1980. There are, however, a number of works that have contributed in important ways to the contemporary understanding of these diﬃculties,
including each of the following: Mann 1982, 1983; Morris 1985; and Stump
and Kretzmann 1985. For some of the earliest contemporary discussions of
simplicity, see Bennet 1969; Ross 1969; Martin 1976; LaCroix 1977 and 1979;
and Wainwright 1979.
3. More often than not, contemporary philosophers have come to the defense of Aquinas’s understanding of simplicity. Cf., e.g., Davies 1987; Dewan
1989; Kretzmann 1983; Lamont 1997; Stump 2003; and Stump and Kretzmann
1985.
4. For convenience, I will often speak of “true intrinsic predications” as
shorthand for the more cumbersome (and also more accurate) phrase “the
truths expressed by true intrinsic predications.” I focus on intrinsic predications
throughout, since no medieval ever thought that divine simplicity requires
God to be identical with entities (if there are any) such as being thought about
by me, which are introduced by purely extrinsic predications. Moreover, I rely
on an intuitive notion of intrinsic predication according to which such predications are those which characterize things “in virtue of the way things themselves are.” So understood, the notion must be distinguished both from that
of essential and from that of non-relational predication, since intrinsic predications can be either contingent (e.g., “Socrates is wise”) or relational (e.g.,
“Socrates has parts”).
5. In what follows I assume the coherence of truthmaker theory, as it is
understood by some of its most prominent defenders (more on this in §§3–4
below). Those who reject this assumption may take the conclusion of my argument to have the form of a bi-conditional—namely, that divine simplicity is
coherent if and only if truthmaker theory (so understood) is.
6. For a brief, independent development of the truthmaker interpretation, see Oppy 2003. For some nascent expressions of the basic idea behind it,
see Leftow 1984 (esp. pp. 51–52, 57) and Ross 1985 (esp. p. 384).
7. Terms such as these are called ‘abstract singular terms’ because they
are the abstract counterparts of concrete terms such as ‘good,’ ‘powerful,’ and
‘wise’ and are grammatically singular in number.
8. This is not to deny, of course, that the doctrine could be restated so as
to be perfectly consistent with all forms of nominalism. But I shall concern
myself in what follows only with the traditional statement of the doctrine,
which is the one lying behind contemporary worries about its coherence.
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9. The possessive pronouns do not explicitly occur in the Latin, but I
think they are implicit here (as they often are in Latin). I have discussed the
theory of properties underlying Anselm’s discussion here (and elsewhere) in
Brower 2004.
10. Those who think of properties as universals might find it odd that PA
introduces properties using expressions of the form ‘a’s F-ness’ rather than ‘Fness’ (especially since expressions of the former sort are now standardly used
to refer to particular properties or tropes). As stated, however, PA is intended
to be neutral as regards the specific nature of the properties to which it refers,
and hence to leave open the question of whether they are universal or particular. If Socrates and Plato are both human, PA tells us that they each have
the property of humanity. Strictly speaking, however, it takes no stand on the
question of whether Socrates’ humanity is identical with Plato’s.
11. For important discussion of both diﬃculties in the literature, see Forrest 1996; Hughes 1989; Mann 1986; Stump and Kretzmann 1985; and Wolterstorﬀ 1991.
12. For a defense of the concrete conception of properties, also commonly referred to as ‘immanent realism,’ see Armstrong 1978, vol. 2, chap. 3 and
Armstrong 1997, chaps. 3–4.
13. When the neo-Platonists (or, for that matter, philosophers such as
Aquinas) speak of creatures as participating in God, they don’t really mean to
suggest that God is exemplified by creatures, and hence is a universal. On the
contrary, they typically mean that creatures are resemblances of, and beings
causally dependent on, God. For discussion of this conception of participation, as well as the attribution of it to Plato himself, see Allen 1960.
14. Cf. Aquinas’s discussion of this issue in Summa Theologiae Ia, q. 8, a. 1.
15. Mann 1982; cf. Mann 1983.
16. Mann doesn’t speak of property instances as properties, since he reserves the latter term for universals. Still, it’s clear from his discussion that he’s
thinking of them along the lines of what philosophers nowadays call particular properties or tropes. Cf. esp. 1982, p. 466.
17. See Bergmann and Brower 2006; Brower forthcoming; Immink 1987;
Jordan 1983, esp. pp. 176–79; Leftow 1990, pp. 584–92; and Plantinga 1980, pp.
28–37.
18. Morris (1985) criticizes Mann on these grounds, as does Wolterstorﬀ
(1991) and Vallicella (1992).
19. For discussion of trope nominalism, see Armstrong 1989; Campbell
1980 and 1990; and, Mulligan, Simons, and Smith 1984.
20. Interestingly, in later work, Mann (1986, pp. 343–53) explicitly considers
the aseity objection as well as the trope-nominalistic reply, though even here he
does not adopt it. Like so many other defenders of simplicity, he is simply unwilling in the end to abandon Platonic realism altogether, and hence tries to rebut the objection from within a realist framework. For discussion of Mann’s reply
here, as well as the new problems it raises, see Wolterstorﬀ 1991, pp. 538–40.
21. Or at least to be constitutive of, and inseparable from, the concept of a
basic or fundamental property. This qualification is needed because many philosophers want to admit the existence of unexemplifiable properties such as
being red and not being red. As Chris Swoyer (2000, §1) points out, however,
“even they typically believe that such properties are intimately related to other [more basic or fundamental] properties (here being red and not being red) that
can be exemplified.”
22. For further discussion and defense of the traditional view, see Oliver
1996 and Swoyer 2000.
23. As indicated earlier (in note 13), this premise is not violated by neoPlatonic conceptions of God, according to which God is that in which all
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things participate. Nor, would I argue, is it violated by the traditional insistence that God is not a substance or person in exactly the same sense we are.
24. As this description makes clear, such “actions” are not to be confused
with events as contemporary philosophers conceive of them.
25. See Rogers 1996, esp. pp. 170–72. Rogers would not accept my description of her view, for she denies that the term ‘property’ can be applied to what
the medievals call actions on the grounds that actions are done or performed,
whereas properties (i.e., qualities or traits) are possessed. This restriction on the
scope of the application of the term, however, seems artificial and even misleading in the context of the medieval philosophical tradition that she claims to be
representing. For as indicated in the text itself, when the medievals speak of
actions (actiones), what they have in mind are concrete individuals inhering in
or belonging to particulars—which, of course, is why they follow Aristotle in
identifying actions (or at least creaturely actions) as one of the nine categories of
accidents (i.e., accidental properties). For a representative medieval discussion
of actions, see Aquinas’s Sententia super Physicam III, lect. 5.
26. See Leftow 1990, pp. 593–94.
27. See Vallicella 1992, esp. pp. 512–19.
28. Leftow (1990, 582–83) actually oﬀers positive arguments for the truth
of divine simplicity. But even if these arguments compelling, they don’t require us to reject the traditional conception of properties as exemplifiables.
For as we have seen, there is nothing in the doctrine of divine simplicity itself
(as stated at DS) that requires the identification of God with a property.
29. In saying all this, I don’t mean to suggest that the traditional conception of properties is unassailable. There are, after all, a number of contexts
in which philosophers habitually conceive of properties in ways that don’t
involve the notion of exemplifiability—namely, as sets of possibilia or functions
from possible worlds to sets of possibilia. My own view is that the “properties” appealed to by these alternative conceptions are not genuine properties
at all, but rather entities introduced to model some of the functional roles that
genuine properties play. But even if I am wrong about this, these alternative
conceptions are not the ones taken for granted in the context of simplicity.
And even if they were, they would be of no use in responding to the objection
that God is a property. On the contrary, they would simply raise the objection
in a diﬀerent form. For saying that God is a set or function seems just as absurd as saying that God is an exemplifiable.
30. Plantinga 1980, p. 49.
31. Plantinga 1980, p. 52.
32. Cf. Armstrong 1997; for the distinction between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ particulars, see pp. 123–26. Gustav Bergmann held a similar conception of particulars. Cf. Wolterstorﬀ 1970 for references and discussion.
33. Cf. again Armstrong 1997.
34. Wolterstorﬀ speaks, at various points in his article, of the need for ‘a
theory of predication’ in connection with divine simplicity, but what he means
by this is a theory about the semantics of predication—one that will explain
how a multiplicity of predicates with distinct senses or meanings can be predicated of a simple God. When I speak of the need for a theory of predication,
however, what I have in mind is theory about the metaphysics of predication—
one that explains the nature of the entities required both for the truth of predication and for the referents of abstract singular terms.
35. Cf., e.g., the approving remarks in Freddoso 2002, pp. xxxiv–xxxv.
36. The suggestion that the medievals accept a truthmaker theory of predication is not original to me, but is explicitly defended in Fox 1987.
37. See, e.g., Armstrong 1997, p. 13; Bigelow 1998, p. 125.
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38. Cf. Bigelow 1988, p. 126; Fox 1987, p. 188; Oliver 1996, p. 69; and Rodrigue-Pereyra 2002.
39. Thus, according to Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002, 34), the best we can do is
to say that an entity E is a truthmaker for a predication P if and only if E is an
entity in virtue of which P is true, and then illustrate what we mean by ‘being
true in virtue of’ with examples.
40. According to Restall (1996, 339), an entity E is a truthmaker for a predication P if and only if E really entails (or is really necessarily such) that P, where
he suggests that ‘real entailment (or necessity)’ is to be understood along the
lines of Anderson and Belnap’s notion of relevant entailment. Rather surprisingly, however, when Restall actually states his account of real entailment, he
explicitly defines it in terms of truthmakers: A really entails B, he says, if and
only if, in every world W, every truthmaker for A is a truthmaker for B. Obviously, this account of non-classical entailment won’t do as a reductive analysis
of the notion of truthmaking.
41. Smith’s definition of truthmaking can be characterized succinctly as
follows (cf. Smith 2002, p. 232): an entity E is a truthmaker for a predication
P if and only if E is necessarily such that it is a part of the total projection of
P, where ‘the total projection of P’ is to be understood as ‘the sum of all those
entities projected by P’ and an entity E is projected by P just in case both P and
P entails that E exists.
42. Cf. O’Connor 1991 for an argument that this can be done with predications involving contingent divine volitions, and cf. Brower forthcoming
and Pruss 2003 for arguments that this can be done with predications of both
types. For a diﬀerent sort of response to this objection, cf. Stump 2003.
43. Cf. e.g., Aquinas’s discussion in Summa Theologiae Ia, q. 19, a. 3.
44. See Armstrong 1989 and 1997.
45. See Armstrong 1989, esp. pp. 116–19. For a more complete development and defense of this view, see Mulligan, Simons, and Smith 1989.
46. Cf., e.g., the following remarks of Aquinas:
It is not necessary that if this is a man and that is a man, then they both
have numerically the same humanity, any more than two white things
have numerically the same whiteness; but it is necessary that the one be
similar to the other in that it has a humanity just as the other does. It is
for this reason that the intellect, considering humanity not as belonging
to this thing, but as humanity, forms a concept that is common to all.
(Scriptum super libros Sententiarum II, d. 17, q.1, a.1)
47. If it is asked in virtue of what Socrates’ justice and God’s justice (or better, God himself) resemble, the answer will be of the same general sort that is
usually oﬀered by trope-nominalists. They resemble just in virtue of being the
concrete individuals they are. End of story.
48. Cf. Summa Theologiae Ia, q. 13, aa. 4–5, where the fact that such diﬀerent
types of entity can plausibly be said to play this role leads Aquinas to conclude
that predicates such as ‘just’ apply to God and creatures only analogously.
49. See MacDonald 1990 for relevant texts and discussion.
50. These sorts of considerations lead Aquinas to say that, strictly speaking, there is no potentiality in God, but only actuality.
51. Perhaps the chief threat to truthmaker theory comes from the so-called
Slingshot argument, which purports to establish the emptiness or uselessness
of the notion of truthmaking. For discussion of this argument, as well as a
response on behalf of truthmakers, see Rodriguez-Pereyra 2001.
52. I am grateful to Michael Bergmann, Thomas Crisp, Thomas Flint, William Hasker, Joshua Hochschild, Patrick Kain, Gyula Klima, Brian Leftow,
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Wesley Morriston, Alvin Plantinga, Alexander Pruss, Michael Rea, Katherin Rogers, Brian Shanley, Jim Stone, Paul Studtmann, several anonymous
referees, and especially Susan Brower-Toland for discussion and comments on
earlier versions of this paper. Research at the early stages of this paper was supported by a grant from Notre Dame’s Center for Philosophy of Religion, which
is hereby gratefully acknowledged. Ancestors of the paper were given at the
Center for Philosophy of Religion Colloquium in 1999, and the Cornell Summer Colloquium in Medieval Philosophy in 1999. I am indebted to members of
the audiences on those occasions for stimulating comments and criticism.
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